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 Why do you want to teach? What are the reasons you decided to major in philosophy in 
college? Why did you consult three different physicians and comb through hundreds of medical 
journals just to find out whether you should have your daughter vaccinated—isn’t asking your 
own doctor sufficient? Motivation is at the root of all of these types of questions. Motivation 
researchers are primarily concerned with the cognitive processes by which people initiate and 
sustain behaviors. For example, if a group of teachers indicate they decided to teach because they 
believe ensuring the next generation of young people enters their adult lives prepared to face the 
challenges of the 21st century, then these teachers are likely describing a belief in the utility of 
what they do. On the other hand, if a student said she decided to major in philosophy because she 
took introductory courses in logic and in ethics and earned superior marks in these classes, then 
her competence beliefs are likely the most salient aspect of her motivation.  
Although motivation historically has been presented in many different ways (e.g., need 
satisfaction, innate drives), in this chapter we frame the most commonly studied constructs of 
motivation as important cognitive structures and processes that guide our behaviors. We 
conceive of behaviors in a broad sense of the word to also include cognitive behaviors such as 
asking oneself whether a certain strategy is the best approach to solve a problem. This focus is in 
line with the purpose of this chapter and handbook—to focus on cognitive structures and 
processes that guide behaviors related specifically to building and evaluating knowledge. Given 
this focus on the cognitive basis of motivation, we then explore how motivational aspects of 
cognition relate to aspects of cognition that concern the nature of knowledge and knowing. 
Although the literature about the intersection of motivation and epistemic cognition is relatively 
small, scholars are becoming increasingly interested in questions such as, “why might some 
students refer to a politician about whether vaccines are effective and safe rather than refer to 
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their family doctor?” At the heart of these types of questions is the assumption that cognitive 
behavior (including epistemic cognition) is motivated. That is, might some students refer to their 
teachers as the definitive source for an answer because they believe that it is not worth the time 
and effort to find more nuanced answers from multiple sources of information? Or might other 
students seek out alternative answers that are different from their textbook because they want to 
show off to their peers and teachers about how smart they are?  
 To understand the linkages between motivation and epistemic cognition, however, we 
must first understand the theoretical frameworks that guide research in motivation as well as the 
empirical findings that have supported them. Motivation is a very broad construct that can 
include competence beliefs (i.e., “Am I able to do this task?”), value beliefs (i.e., “Do I find this 
task compelling?”), and goal orientations (i.e., “What is the reason I am engaging in this task?”). 
Given the large number of constructs included under the umbrella term of motivation, 
clarification is necessary regarding which constructs are typically included when researchers 
describe motivation. From there, we explore the studies that have examined the links between 
epistemic cognition and motivation, we consider ways that theory on epistemic cognition has 
implicitly enveloped motivational constructs, and we delineate how clear motivational constructs 
might inform such research. We conclude by exploring areas where future research is needed, 
and offer comments about the types of studies that may be productive for the field. 
Frameworks for Understanding Motivation 
Understanding What People Value 
 One family of constructs that has received a considerable amount of attention in the 
motivation literature is individuals’ beliefs about the value of a task or subject area. People’s 
motivation to do any task is tied to the value they see in doing it.  Eccles and Wigfield (2002) 
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suggest there are four major components to this value component: attainment value, which is the 
importance of doing well on a given task; intrinsic value, which is the enjoyment one gains 
doing a task; utility value, which is defined as how a task fits into an individual’s future plans or 
personal agenda; and cost, which refers to what the individual has to give up in order to do a task 
and how much effort must be exerted. Research has shown that students’ task values predict 
whether or not they actually pursue a task (Battle & Wigfield, 2003; Durik, Vida, & Eccles, 
2006; Simpkins, Davis-Kean, & Eccles, 2006). This is especially true regarding career choices 
(Brophy, 2009). Research has shown that when students perceive a task to be useful for their 
future endeavors, they are more likely to initiate an activity and remain engaged in it (Greene, 
Miller, Crowson, Duke, & Akey, 2004; Johnson & Sinatra, 2013; Miller & DeBacker, 1999), and 
do better on measures of achievement (Cole, Bergin, & Whittaker, 2008; Greene et al., 2004).  
 A closely related way to examine whether students find a task compelling is research on 
interest, the positive cognitive and emotional reaction a person has to a specific object (Hidi & 
Renninger, 2006; Schiefele, 1991).  The object in an academic setting might be a particular task, 
topic, or subject area. Researchers further divide interest into individual interest, which a student 
holds toward the object in general, and situational interest, which is brought about by a particular 
context (Mitchell, 1993; Schiefele, 2009). As an example, a student might not be very interested 
in science, but could become highly engaged in an experiment that involves colorful chemical 
reactions or appreciate science when a particular teacher describes how science makes the world 
a better place. Situational interest can develop into individual interest under the right 
circumstances (Hidi & Renninger, 2006).  
Understanding People’s Competence Beliefs 
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 Researchers concerned with people’s competence beliefs often focus on two constructs 
that have received the lion’s share of research in motivation. The first construct is self-efficacy, 
which Bandura (1997) defined as individuals’ beliefs about their own capabilities to learn or 
perform tasks at designated levels. A wealth of research has shown that students’ self-efficacy 
plays an important role in their academic success and in the academic choices they make 
(Schunk & Pajares, 2005).  Students’ academic self-efficacy has been shown to relate to (a) their 
performance in many different academic subjects, (b) their level of interest in those subjects, (c) 
the amount of effort they put forth in accomplishing those academic tasks, and (d) their 
subsequent career choices (see Pajares & Urdan, 2006).  
 A second major construct discussed in reference to students’ competence beliefs is their 
implicit theories of ability, which (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) described as the view that 
individuals hold of their ability as either a fixed entity or as a quality that can change with effort 
and appropriate strategies. Those who adopt a fixed theory of ability tend to view their ability as 
a relatively static trait that cannot be changed, whereas those who adopt an incremental theory of 
ability are more likely to believe their ability can change. Decades of research have shown that 
implicit theories of ability predict academic achievement (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; 
Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Dweck, 2007; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 
1999; Robins & Pals, 2002; Stipek & Gralinski, 1996).  The literature in this field has shown that 
implicit theories do not influence achievement directly, however. Their influence is mediated by 
students’ goal orientations.  
Understanding the Orientation of People’s Goals 
 Goal orientations have had an extensive history in the motivation literature (see Maehr & 
Zusho, 2009). They deal with individuals’ reasons for initiating a task and continuing to engage 
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in it. In the academic domain, there are two broad orientations from which students might 
approach a task (Ames & Archer, 1988; Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Nicholls, 1984). They could 
adopt a performance goal, seeking to demonstrate competence to others. Alternatively, they 
could endorse a mastery or learning goal, pursuing a task for the sake of improving skills and 
understanding. Goals might also be divided further by whether students are approaching or 
avoiding the possible outcome (Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot & McGregor, 2001). For instance, 
students might have a performance approach goal, in which they want to demonstrate how smart 
they are, or a performance avoidance goal, in which their main objective is not to appear 
incompetent at the task. 
 Scholars have noted that individuals often orient themselves toward different personal 
goal orientations because of the “messages in the learning environment (e.g., the classroom or 
school) that make certain goals salient” (Urdan & Schoenfelder, 2006, p. 334). In classrooms that 
emphasize social comparison, the goal structures could be described as performance oriented, 
whereas in classrooms in which deep learning and understanding are valued rather than surface-
level memorization the goal structures could be considered mastery-oriented. Decades of 
research have demonstrated that mastery goal structures are associated with adaptive learning 
patterns (for a review see Meece, Anderman, & Anderman, 2006), suggesting that environmental 
factors created within classrooms could be contributing to the ways in which students orient 
themselves to academic tasks.  
 In sum, motivation is a broad field composed of many different constructs and theoretical 
frameworks. It is a field of study concerned with addressing the question, “why do people 
behave the way they do?”  Answers could pertain to, among others, beliefs about competence, 
beliefs about the value that people place on a task, or the goals to which people orient 
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themselves. Traditionally, these beliefs have been studied in relation to observable behaviors 
such as solving mathematics problems or pursuing careers in various fields. Yet, how might 
motivation play out in the context of epistemic cognition in which the behaviors might be more 
invisible? 
How Scholars in Epistemic Cognition Have Approached Motivation 
 If students believe, for example, that one historian’s account of how World War II began 
is indisputably true, might there be motivational consequences to this belief? Would the 
motivational consequences for these students be different from their peers who believe that the 
“true” cause of WWII can never be fully known, and that this historian’s account is merely one 
point of view about an event? Scholars who have explored these types of questions are 
concerned with the relationships between students’ epistemic cognition regarding a field of study 
and their motivation to engage in that field of study. We examine this line of inquiry next. 
Epistemic Cognition and Relations to Motivation  
Drawing from research in mathematics education (Schoenfeld, 1983, 1989), Schommer 
(1990) set out to investigate what she called epistemological beliefs and their relationship to 
learning. Here we will use the more common “epistemic” belief. Her underlying assumption was 
that epistemic beliefs influenced how students learned academic material, which was in line with 
Schoenfeld’s assumptions regarding mathematics learning. Schommer posited that epistemic 
beliefs included beliefs about the structure of, certainty of, and source of knowledge, as well as 
the speed and the control of knowledge acquisition. The construction of the latter two 
dimensions was influenced by Schoenfeld’s findings regarding students’ beliefs about 
mathematical knowledge being ascertained very quickly (speed of knowledge acquisition), and 
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by Dweck and Leggett's (1988) work regarding people’s beliefs about the malleability of their 
intelligence.  
The empirical literature supporting Schommer’s (1990) framework of epistemic beliefs 
has shown that beliefs about knowledge and knowing have important relationships to motivation. 
Early scholarship suggested that epistemic beliefs give rise to students’ motivation. This likely 
emanated from Hofer and Pintrich's (1997, 2002) hypothesis that epistemic beliefs might 
function as a type of implicit theory that gives rise to students’ motivational orientations. The 
studies that follow point to this possibility, in which epistemic beliefs orient students toward 
certain types of goals, which then have implications for the ways in which students regulate their 
motivation.  
In one example, Bråten and Strømsø (2004) revealed one aspect of how epistemic beliefs 
function like a type of implicit theory by showing that students who believed in stable and 
unchanging knowledge (considered less constructivist) were less likely than their peers with 
more constructivist orientations to adopt mastery goal orientations. Similarly, Chen and Pajares 
(2010) showed through a path analysis that an incremental view of ability in science was directly 
related to students’ beliefs that scientific knowledge is dynamic and evolving, and that 
experimental results are a good way to generate new questions about science (rather than serve 
as simple demonstrations about things we already know to be true). They also found that fixed 
views of ability in science were directly related to students’ beliefs that scientific knowledge is 
best described as coming from an external authority rather than from one’s own personal 
reasoning and thoughts, and that scientific knowledge consists mostly of truths that are knowable 
with certainty. These findings suggested that views about malleable intellectual capacity were 
related to views about a dynamic nature of knowledge, which were in turn related to higher end-
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of-year grades. On the other hand, those who viewed attributes such as intelligence or scientific 
knowledge as static were more likely to characterize those attributes as simplistic, all-or-nothing, 
entities. Similar to Bråten and Strømsø's (2004) work, Chen and Pajares’s study suggested these 
beliefs about the dynamic nature of ability and knowledge were indirectly related to self-
efficacy, self-regulatory beliefs, and ultimately students’ grades through their effects on goal 
orientations.  
A similar study by Mason, Boscolo, Tornatora, and Ronconi (2012) showed through a 
path analysis that, for students in Grades, 5, 8, and 11, the more students believed in scientific 
experimentation as a tool used to provide evidence for questions and to generate new questions 
to ask, the more likely these students were to pursue learning activities to understand the 
material. They also found, although students’ belief in an uncertain and constantly evolving 
scientific knowledge base was not significantly related to goal orientations, this belief was 
directly related to science knowledge. These findings extend those from Chen and Pajares 
(2010).  
Beghetto and Baxter (2012) used structural equation models to explore the relationships 
between self-efficacy, epistemic beliefs, intellectual risk-taking (the willingness to share 
tentative ideas, ask questions, and try new tasks), and teachers’ rating of students’ understanding 
of science or mathematics. Although their findings in science mirrored the findings of the 
aforementioned studies, Beghetto and Baxter found that students who held their own 
mathematics competence in high regard were more likely to believe that mathematical 
knowledge was external to them. This may reflect a belief that mathematical competence has to 
do with understanding knowledge from competent experts, and less to do with developing the 
conceptual understanding to solve problems creatively in a variety of ways.  
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Finally, although the vast majority of studies concerning the relationships between 
epistemic cognition and motivation are cross-sectional, we point to one experimental study that 
specifically isolated epistemic cognition and explored the effects of such a manipulation on 
outcomes that included motivation. In a quasi-experimental study, Muis and Duffy (2012) 
manipulated the epistemic climate of classrooms such that students in the intervention condition 
experienced a classroom environment that demonstrated statistics knowledge as contestable and 
constantly evolving. Students in the control condition experienced statistics instruction in a 
traditional format that did not challenge the epistemic climate. They found that students in the 
intervention classroom evinced changes toward more constructivist stances, which coincided 
with increased statistics self-efficacy. The authors posited that, because of the intervention, 
students changed the ways in which they thought about statistics knowledge, and in turn, used 
different strategies to understand the material, which forced students to more deeply process the 
material. Ultimately, this resulted in greater self-efficacy for mastering the content. Students’ 
self-reported epistemic beliefs and motivation in the control condition, however, remained 
constant. 
Taken together, the aforementioned studies suggest that, when a field of study (e.g., 
science or statistics) is presented as a dynamic body of knowledge that requires individuals to 
inquire deeply to understand the subject, then students are more likely to orient their goals 
toward understanding the subject rather than demonstrate their competence to others or avoid 
appearing incompetent. In turn, when classroom structures encourage mastery goals people are 
more likely to embark on a trajectory that involves expending additional effort to self-regulate 
their learning and develop strategies to better understand the material. 
The Motivation Behind Epistemic Cognition 
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 The line of inquiry we just outlined explores relationships between the different 
dimensions of epistemic cognition on the one hand and motivation toward a particular academic 
subject on the other hand.  Another way in which scholars in epistemic cognition have studied 
issues related to motivation is by exploring the reasons why individuals would want to engage in 
thinking about knowledge and knowing in the first place. Chinn and colleagues (Chinn, 
Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011; Chinn, Rinehart, & Buckland, 2014) have pioneered this 
line of inquiry under what is often referred to as epistemic cognition (Greene, Azevedo, & 
Torney-Purta, 2008), which is a far more expansive construct than the epistemological beliefs 
mentioned earlier. This expanded perspective seems to fold motivation constructs into epistemic 
cognition. That is, it acknowledges that thinking about knowledge is not merely a “cold” 
cognitive process (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993), but a “hot” process that involves affective 
and motivational components.  
 This expansion of epistemic cognition includes the traditional epistemic beliefs, but also 
includes components such as epistemic aims, epistemic values, and the reliability of processes 
used to obtain knowledge (Chinn et al., 2011). Epistemic aims are the goals that people adopt 
toward knowledge. Epistemic aims are directed toward end-states of knowledge pursuit, called 
epistemic achievements, which might vary from obtaining true facts or understanding the 
relations between these facts. In differentiating epistemic aims from non-epistemic aims, Chinn, 
Rinehart, and Buckland (2014) argued that the latter are aims that are not specifically directed 
toward knowledge. For example, the epistemic aim of understanding differs from the non-
epistemic aims of experiencing pleasure or maintaining self-image, even though such aims might 
interact.  
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 There are similarities in Chinn and colleagues’ framework to work done by scholars 
studying goal orientations. For example, a mastery goal orientation involves a primary focus on 
the actual act of learning and understanding for learning’s sake. Two common mastery goal 
measures (Achievement Goal Questionnaire, Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Patterns of Adaptive 
Learning Survey, Midgley et al., 2000) include items that get at the act of seeking to understand: 
“One of my goals in my classes is to learn as much as I can,” and “It is important to me to 
understand the content of this course as thoroughly as possible.” Performance goal orientations, 
on the other hand, particularly those with a normative standard (Elliot, Murayama, & Pekrun, 
2011), involve a primary focus on demonstrating competence to others. Although students can 
certainly demonstrate competence to others while also trying to understand something deeply, 
the emphasis is on which goal is the primary focus. However, in the case of a multiple goal 
pursuit (e.g., Barron & Harackiewicz, 2000; Daniels et al., 2008; Pintrich, 2000) students might 
be oriented toward juggling both types of goals. This issue of a multiple goal pursuit could 
inform scholarship on epistemic and non-epistemic aims (Chinn et al., 2014). For example, just 
as it is quite reasonable to read a book both for the sake of learning about the history behind 
modern models of the atom, as well as to read the book to ace a test (i.e., orientation toward both 
a mastery and a performance goal), the same is true for epistemic cognition. That is, students 
could be oriented toward understanding the biases behind a particular author’s version of history 
so as to understand the complexity of the issue (an epistemic aim). However, these same students 
could also be oriented toward understanding the authors’ biases in order to be esteemed by their 
peers for finding an interesting insight (a non-epistemic aim).  
 Whereas the discussion about epistemic aims reveals similarities to goal orientations, 
Chinn, Buckland, and Samarapungavan (2011) also included features in their model that relate to 
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issues of understanding what people value. For example, Chinn et al. noted that epistemic aims 
can be informed by what they call epistemic values—epistemic achievements that individuals 
find interesting, useful, or otherwise compelling. If an individual sees, for example, video 
footage of archaeologists discovering the remains of a human skeleton in the early Jamestown 
settlement that suggested cannibalism during the “starving time” of 1609 to 1610, this startling 
discovery might trigger excitement and interest in understanding the circumstances surrounding 
the situation. This interest trigger might then recruit a series of behaviors directed toward 
whichever goal or combination of goals this student is oriented toward.  
To play out the complex interactions between epistemic aims, epistemic values, and 
motivation, we present two hypothetical scenarios. First, going to the earlier example of 
Jamestown, if classroom conditions are such that students have to sift through evidence from 
primary sources and forensics results to seek a better understanding of what life was like in the 
“starving time,” students’ motivation could certainly be recruited toward treating knowledge in 
history as tentative (i.e., we do not know for sure what life was like in Jamestown to have led to 
cannibalism) and highly complex (i.e., understanding the situation requires historians, 
archaeologists, and scientists). On the other hand, if classroom conditions are such that students 
are presented with a news story about how forensic scientists discovered that a person was 
cannibalized during the “starving time,” and that the colonists were incompetent farmers and so 
could not produce enough food for themselves, motivation could certainly be recruited toward 
treating historical knowledge as certain (i.e., we know for certain that the colonists were inept 
and therefore could not produce enough food, which led to cannibalism) and somewhat simple 
(i.e., finding the answer to the question was a forensic science issue that does not require 
historical knowledge to figure out). Notice that in both scenarios if the classroom centered on a 
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highly engaging activity in which students worked collaboratively about a real-life problem that 
actual professionals deal with, students could see the value of wrestling with issues related to 
knowledge and knowing, and they could develop the competence beliefs to do so. Researchers 
and practitioners could consider these activities to be quite motivationally sound. However, in 
the first case, presenting a more comprehensive case of the types of inquiry happening in 
Jamestown recruits students’ cognitive resources (both epistemic and motivational) toward a 
more nuanced and adequate picture of knowledge and knowing. Whereas in the second case, 
although a compelling and interesting presentation of the material could be motivating, that 
motivation may be directed toward a more simplistic view of knowledge and knowing. We bring 
this up because in scholarship that explores the relationship between epistemic beliefs and 
motivation, such as in Chen and Pajares’s (2010) or Bråten and Strømsø's (2004) work, their 
results suggest that more nuanced and complex views of knowledge and knowing are related to 
more adaptive forms of motivation. However, in the epistemic cognition framework outlined by 
Chinn, Buckland, and Samarapungavan (2011) beliefs about value, competence, and goal 
orientations can be directed toward any variety of outcomes that can vary widely in how nuanced 
they are, which can be epistemic or not. Such a line of inquiry requires a conception of and 
measures of motivation and epistemic cognition that are highly specific, both to the domain and 
likely even to the task in which students are engaged.  
 As the field has expanded from conceptualizing a set of personally held beliefs about 
knowledge to a broad spectrum of cognitive processes related to knowledge seeking, motivation 
has implicitly been folded into the framework of epistemic cognition. Researchers in both fields 
have begun to bridge the gap between these two critical components of learners’ thinking and 
behavior. This expanded conceptualization of epistemic cognition has generated an exciting 
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array of questions and lines of inquiry that researchers can pursue. In the final section of this 
chapter, we pose some of these lines of inquiry, with a specific focus on the intersection of 
epistemic cognition and motivation.    
Future Directions for Research 
Epistemic achievements are a worthy educational outcome in their own right. However, 
schooling has long been considered a means to an end. For example, students are told to get good 
grades and do well on tests so that they can get into a good college and/or get a good job (Kuhn, 
2003). Over a decade ago,  Kuhn (2003) argued that, “once an activity becomes identified as 
merely a means to an end, it becomes easy to devalue it as without significance in its own right. 
One undertakes it because it produces some totally different dividend that is valued” (p. 18). 
Later, she argued that intellectual pursuits should be valued because the activities that produce 
intellectual achievements are valuable in and of themselves, and that students can and do 
experience these activities and achievements as enjoyable in their own right. The question Kuhn 
posed was, “what makes it happen?”  What allows for students to derive intrinsic enjoyment and 
value in engaging in intellectual pursuits? One answer that she posed was that, “students’ 
developing understanding of what it means to learn and to know is a key component of the 
process. … Their school experiences are for most students the primary basis for the 
understandings they construct of what it means to learn and know and, not incidentally, whether 
investing one’s time and effort in such pursuits is worthwhile” (p. 18). At the heart of this issue 
is finding ways for students’ motivation toward wrestling with knowledge and knowing in 
progressively more adequate ways to flourish. Current classroom and school conditions, for the 
most part, make it difficult to see the value of engaging in activities that do this. However, we 
believe that research at the intersection of epistemic cognition and motivation can draw on these 
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two frameworks to investigate the ways in which educators, policy makers, and instructional 
designers can create environments and activities that make engaging in intellectual activities that 
focus on forming progressively more adequate ways of dealing with knowledge and knowing an 
integral and valued part of students’ experiences in a large variety of fields.  
Integrating Frameworks for Epistemic Cognition and Motivation 
 Central to the problem of creating environments in which students find it worthwhile to 
engage in intellectual pursuits is what motivation researchers would call value beliefs. The vast 
literature about the development of interest and intrinsic motivation could be of great help to 
those exploring how students’ interests in engaging in activities that lead to progressively more 
adequate epistemic achievements are triggered in the first place. Furthermore, how are students’ 
interests in these activities not just triggered for a moment, but also sustained so that students are 
likely to re-engage in activities that lead to progressively more adequate epistemic achievements 
throughout their lifetime unprompted from external requirements? When we say “progressively 
more adequate epistemic achievements” we are describing movements toward a more 
comprehensive understanding of issues, knowledge, and/or skills in which students see evidence 
and rationales for a variety of positions, but ultimately commit to one stance based on reason and 
evidence.  
Of course, all of this cognitive activity directed toward epistemic achievements requires 
the enlistment of motivation to exert the effort to engage in these types of activities in the first 
place. Current theories of interest development  (see Hidi & Renninger, 2006) may help us in this 
regard. Triggered situational interest refers to a psychological state that results from momentary 
changes in affect. These triggers are usually externally supported (Hidi & Renninger, 2006). 
EPISTEMIC COGNITION AND MOTIVATION  17 
Future research could investigate the types of activities and cues that trigger an interest 
specifically to think critically about knowledge and knowing. 
In particular, because students are engaging in activities and are consuming and using 
information in an increasingly mediated world—accessing stories, entertainment, messages, and 
other information from portable and connected devices—researchers and educators need to 
understand the variety of conditions that trigger students’ interests within these virtual learning 
environments to think specifically about progressively more adequate conceptions of knowledge 
and knowing. For example, it is easy to read a news story from one’s social media feeds without 
thinking critically about the adequacy of the claims made in the article. What are some ways in 
which educators, instructional designers, and researchers can trigger students’ interests in 
enlisting their cognitive resources toward things such as exploring who wrote the news piece and 
why that matters, or thinking about whether or not the claims are well justified? Some research 
has shown that interest can be triggered by using novelty (Palmer, 2009), promoting student 
autonomy (Palmer, 2009; Skinner, Furrer, Marchand, & Kindermann, 2008), using group work 
(Minnaert, Boekaerts, & Brabander, 2007), and making the utility of an activity salient 
(Hulleman, Godes, Hendricks, & Harackiewicz, 2010). Yet, we know little about the specific 
activities that trigger students’ interests toward reasoning about knowledge and knowing in 
progressively more adequate ways. For example, Sandoval and Harven (2011) found that 
autonomy, although an important general principle for promoting motivation in students, was 
especially beneficial in triggering students’ interests in science inquiry when the activities had to 
do with collecting and analyzing data. However, in order to trigger students’ interests in focusing 
on the epistemic components of data collection and analysis, what specific things do educators 
and instructional designers need to make salient? In addition, Sandoval and Harven found that 
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tasks related to investigation, rather than tasks related to argumentation, appeared to have the 
greatest effect on triggering students’ interests because students noted the high value of having 
evidence to back up one’s own ideas.  
 The intriguing findings from Sandoval and Harven (2011) above lead to another issue. 
Triggering an interest in thinking about knowledge and knowing is one thing, but sustaining that 
interest is quite another endeavor. Yet, this is a critical component in developing students’ long-
term and enduring individual interests toward an activity. Sandoval and Harven noted that the 
key feature that seemed promising in sustaining interest was students’ desire to be able to have 
good evidence to support their ideas. This suggests that making the utility of tasks salient holds 
promise in sustaining students’ interests. However, because students who perceive something to 
be useful but also do not believe that they can accomplish this valuable task are likely to 
experience quite negative academic and motivational outcomes (see Bandura, 1997), future 
research also needs to explore the variety of ways to support both students’ beliefs about utility 
and their beliefs about their own competence.  
In addition, research has shown that, whereas the earlier phases of interest development, 
such as triggering interest, are primarily affective, the later phases of interest development, such 
as well-developed individual interest, also require that students possess a sufficient stock of 
knowledge and a well-developed self-efficacy. Future research could investigate the specific 
types of knowledge that need to be built up so that students’ individual interest to engage in 
activities that lead to progressively more adequate epistemic achievements can develop. For 
example, what outcomes could be likely if students have a large store of knowledge about the 
variety of sources from where knowledge can come (i.e., professional mathematician, teachers, 
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peers, books, and even themselves), but have little knowledge about how to adjudicate among all 
the sources? 
As we mentioned earlier, self-efficacy is a key determinant in students’ academic 
choices, including choices to recruit cognitive resources toward dealing with knowledge and 
knowing in progressively more adequate ways. Because self-efficacy is so important researchers 
have begun to investigate what fuels self-efficacy. Bandura (1997) posited that there are four 
sources of self-efficacy. Students’ perceived past successes inform their beliefs about how well 
they can perform in future endeavors. These mastery experiences are thought to be the strongest 
source of self-efficacy (see Usher & Pajares, 2008). However, in the absence of sufficient 
mastery experiences, students need to draw from other sources such as vicarious experiences 
(thinking, “if they can do it, then so can I”), social persuasions (the spoken and unspoken 
messages from significant others that inform our self-efficacy), and affective states (anxiety, 
adrenaline rush, moods, and other feelings). Although researchers have explored these broad 
categories regarding the antecedents of self-efficacy, less well-known are the specifics of these 
sources. For example, if mastery experiences are the strongest source, then what exactly counts 
as a mastery experience? Also, if the strength of vicarious experiences and social persuasions 
depends on how well a student identifies with or trusts the vicarious model or persuader, then 
what specific things encourage a strong identification or trust? As it relates to thinking about 
knowledge and knowing, what specific experiences could tell students that they have, for 
example, successfully adjudicated between several sources of knowledge? What characteristics 
do students look for when they identify a suitable role model who can show them how to handle 
knowledge and knowing in progressively more adequate ways?  
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Overall, the questions and lines of inquiry we have posed regarding the development of 
interest and self-efficacy require researchers to be able to capture data about the more fine-
grained tasks students undertake so that educators and instructional designers can create learning 
environments that build students’ self-efficacy and take full advantage of interest-triggering and 
interest-sustaining features that can lead to enduring individual interests in thinking about 
knowledge and knowing in sophisticated ways. In our final section, we discuss issues related to 
capturing these data. 
Issues of Measurement 
 Research in epistemic cognition has had a long history of measurement issues (see 
DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2008). One reason for this might be because 
students’ epistemic cognition often operates “under the radar” such that students are unaware of 
what their epistemic aims are, for example, or what they believe about the certainty of a 
knowledge claim even if they are prompted to think about them. In addition, students might be 
able to articulate only a limited set of their cognitions related to knowledge and knowing (i.e., 
they might articulate their beliefs about the source of knowledge, but not their epistemic values). 
Furthermore, students’ cognitions (both epistemic and motivation) may only crystallize or 
become activated when presented with a situation in which they have to act, which means that 
measures need to be quite context and task specific. These cognitions are very likely to vary 
depending on the situation, such that in one situation students might set an epistemic aim of 
understanding and learning about a knowledge claim, but 10 seconds later might set a non-
epistemic aim of trying to impress their peers. Therefore, we encourage researchers to explore a 
variety of ways to assess students’ epistemic cognition and motivation, especially in ways that 
allow researchers to tap these cognitions and beliefs in situ.  
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 One way to innovate the ways epistemic cognition and motivation are measured is to 
leverage the capabilities of computers. Researchers are already using computers as assessment 
tools to assess cognitive activities. For example, the SAVE Science project (see Ketelhut, Nelson, 
Schifter, & Kim, 2013; Nelson, Kim, Foshee, & Slack, 2014) use immersive virtual 
environments (IVEs) to assess students’ scientific inquiry skills. Rather than assessing scientific 
inquiry by using multiple-choice questions, these virtual assessments allow researchers to collect 
large amounts of information regarding students’ actions in the virtual world. Inferences can be 
made regarding students’ thinking as they reason through complex scientific problems. Other 
virtual environments such as Epistemic Games (http://edgaps.org/gaps/) also seek to create 
models that assess complex problem solving skills.   
In a similar way, researchers can use these types of virtual assessments to infer students’ 
motivation and epistemic cognition. For example, scientific inquiry skills require students to 
collect data from a variety of sources, use experimental data to make inferences, and use the 
information to come to some conclusions. These types of inquiry processes tap into issues of 
epistemic cognition by getting at students’ beliefs about a scientific authority or how much they 
trust visual cues in the IVE versus the experimental results they obtained. When students have to 
perform an action, these actions are likely goal-directed. It could be quite feasible to assess 
whether the goals are directed toward knowledge or toward non-epistemic aims. These are only a 
few examples of the variety of beliefs and cognitions that researchers could gather from using 
these IVEs.  
Although such assessments are not meant to replace traditional assessments such as self-
report questionnaires, virtual assessments certainly can provide researchers with more fine-
grained, in-the-moment information regarding the goals that students are oriented toward when 
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pursuing epistemic achievements, the value they see in attaining these epistemic achievements, 
and students’ beliefs about whether they can muster their resources toward successfully reaching 
these epistemic achievements. In that way, these virtual assessments can offer a more nuanced 
look into students’ motivation and epistemic cognition. However, there are issues of validity and 
reliability that need to be addressed before researchers can make claims about students’ 
cognitions and beliefs, and their relationships with other outcomes of interest. This is a ripe area 
of research, and one that will require researchers to find creative yet rigorous ways to evaluate 
how valid and reliable these dynamic assessments are. We are excited by these possibilities for 
future research, and encourage scholars to continue using innovative technologies not just as 
learning and teaching tools, but also as a way to assess students’ cognitions. 
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